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The Crisis and the Political 
Reality
LUIZ WERNECK VIANNA (INTERVIEW)
THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST Luiz Werneck Vianna was interviewed by the executive editor of Estudos Avançados, journalist Marco Antonio Coelho, when he spoke about the crisis in the Congress. The interview was held on 
August 21, 2009, at the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ).
In addition to analyzing the causes of the impasse in the Brazilian Parliament, 
Luiz Werneck Vianna gave his opinion on various political issues. He commented on 
several burning issues, such as the performance of president Lula, whom he described 
as a great negotiator that monopolizes Brazil’s political world. He also emphasized 
the waning of the Workers’ Party (PT), the judicialization of politics, the prospects of 
the 2010 presidential election, and predicted what will happen when Lula leaves the 
presidency. He stressed that the media, the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecutor’s 
Offi ce are now an explosive presence in Brazil’s political milieu.
Luiz Werneck Vianna holds a Bachelor’s degree in Law and Social Sciences 
from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He earned a Master’s degree in 
Political Science and Sociology from University Research Institute of Rio de 
Janeiro and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of São Paulo. He also earned 
a postdoctoral degree from the Universita Degli Studi di Milano. He is a professor 
at Iuperj and the author of many books, including Esquerda brasileira e tradição 
republicana: estudos de conjuntura sobre a era FHC-Lula (2006).
* * *
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — What is your analysis of the crisis of the Congress?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — More than a crisis of the Congress, this is a 
broader crisis of political representation in Brazil, brought about by the permissive 
situation that dominated the mid-1980s, after the end of the dictatorial regime. It 
was expected that, over time, one would see a sedimentation, a defi nition, a more 
tangible relationship between the “political class” (a category that can be said to 
exist only through poetic license), the population and politically active citizens.
Sedimentation did not take place as anticipated and we now have a system 
that consists of a multitude of party groups, which is not conducive to establishing 
a solid and stable relationship between representatives (the parliamentarians) and 
those they represent (the electorate).
This is a fact that must not be obscured. Even though the issue has been 
repeatedly examined by researchers of Brazilian politics, there is no minimum 
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consensus on how to carry out a true political reform in the country: a reform 
capable of creating new grounds, whereby parliamentarians speak upward less, 
seek less from the Executive branch, and attempt to establish stable and permanent 
relationship with civil society.
Actually, we are experiencing a type of logic whereby the chief concern of 
the “political class” is its own reproduction. In that sense, it’s essential for this class 
to have access to the governmental sphere, that is to say, the administration, which 
controls the resources and the funding of public works that might interest the 
constituency of the representatives, who fundamentally seek their own perpetuation.
This is a global phenomenon, to be sure, but this does not remedy its 
negative effects among us. Much is said about this issue in France and in the major 
developed countries of the West, where democracy should be “mature” by now. 
In Brazil, however, the process has reached a level of paroxysm, especially after the 
introduction of a political arrangement known as “coalition presidentialism.”
We’ve witnessed the impeachment of Collor in the recent past, a president 
who tried to govern without a majority in Congress. Since then, the fundamental 
strategy of the presidents who succeeded him has been to create a coalition of 
various parties to obtain support from Congress. Although this power is weak and 
chronically in crisis, the Executive, which is strong and powerful, rightly assesses 
that it is impossible to govern without a trustworthy congressional majority. 
Therefore, it is forced to forgo important aspects of the program that enabled its 
election, aspects that are not consensual among the parties that will constitute its 
parliamentary base.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — How did Lula obtain parliamentary support for his 
government?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — Lula’s administration was keenly aware of the risks 
of this parliamentary frailty. At fi rst, it sought an institutional path that seemed 
quite promising. He organized the Council of Economic and Social Development, 
whose members included various societal and corporate delegates: businesspeople, 
workers, different types of professionals, and so on.
The idea was to create a place where opinions could be put forth, 
strengthened by the legitimacy of the assembly from which they emerged, and 
taken to Parliament with these credentials. At that time, it was even feared that 
this Council might become a cabal, a shortcut that would leave the Legislature 
somewhat powerless. The Council did not take on this role, however, and had sparse 
results in terms of forming public opinion and bearing upon the views of Congress.
This happened because the Executive itself created mechanisms that 
facilitated access to congressional life (i.e., that made it easier to mobilize the 
parties). These mechanisms were not necessarily consistent with Lula’s original 
program, but assured political support for the government. Political support was 
further guaranteed by opening up and selling out the machine of government 
to serve the interests of party delegates. A veritable market was created – politics 
itself became a marketplace –, as attested by the so-called “mensalão” episode1. 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (67), 2009 49
The arena of political support became a business exchange, as the parties and their 
parliamentary representatives began to receive institutionalized stipends to guarantee 
congressional support for the administration.
The administration’s struggle to consolidate its power in face of the 
disruption of congressional life was no small thing. From Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso to Lula, the Executive branch has been acting in accordance with the logic 
of such a system, with the strict political logic of such a system. It strives to capture 
sectors with little expression in Brazilian political life in an attempt to establish a 
majority, and it does so with a grammar that is more business-driven than politically 
inspired.
This exposure was dangerous, as the “mensalão” episode demonstrated, a 
negative experience that in Lula’s second term has meant the abandonment of a 
retail for a wholesale policy – that is, a coalition with the main political party in 
Brazil, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).
[This has meant] opening up the various levels of government to the 
interests of the dignitaries of that party, who, in each region, seek to assure their 
own perpetuation, constituencies and votes. This is a policy dominated by the 
fragmentary interests of regions and micro-regions. The administration should be 
able to design the country’s larger political reality, even while respecting the limits 
imposed by the nature of political coalitions.
With the latter-day radicalization of these trends, and apparently not satisfi ed 
with providing second-tier positions in his administration, Lula invited everyone 
into the government: agrarian capitalism and its nemesis, the Landless Movement 
(MST); the big industrialists and fi nanciers; and workers. (Labor unions have a 
greater presence in the Lula government than at any other time of the Brazilian 
Republic, including Getúlio Vargas’ tenure.)
By means of this practice, he established a parallel Parliament inside the 
government, indulging and arbitrating the various confl icting interests that arise in 
society. In this sense, the so-called reforms – fi scal, political, labor, union – are not 
processed within society or in its most import stage set, Congress. The main arena is 
internal, i.e., the government itself.
Under the arbitration of the president, who makes decisions regarding 
confl icting interests, this framework has given the Brazilian Executive a 
disproportionately large role. Furthermore, through different institutions and 
procedures, Lula has not only attenuated the strength of Parliament but has also 
arrogated to himself the right to promote his interests inside the Congress walls.
The crisis of the presidency of the Senate bears witness to this fact. Senator 
Sarney’s main defense system was outside Congress, under the control of the 
president. The crisis had everything to threaten the government’s power base, 
including members of its party, with future obstacles in their electoral battles. This 
fact became clear in the incident with senator Aloysio Mercadante.
The discussion of a project and a guiding principle for Brazil, an essential 
matter, has no place in Parliament. In turn, the society feels entirely displaced from 
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politics, which it sees as a kind of circus ring where parliamentarians stage their 
comedy of errors in everyone’s sight.
Many things can happen in these circumstances, such as the incident with 
the Receita Federal [Brazil’s IRS]. The head of the IRS, a Workers’ Party militant 
indicated by a union of party members, took offi ce and immediately replaced all 
the men appointed by the previous administration. Her actions and those of the 
trade unionists associated with the Workers’ Party engendered a deep crisis that 
ultimately tarnished the government, whose best defense came from Everardo 
Maciel, former head of the same agency during the previous administration (under 
the Brazilian Social Democratic Party – PSDB), who criticized the conduct of the 
by-then demoted and deposed Workers’ Party head of the Receita Federal.
A comedy of errors resulted from this inarticulacy between the Executive, 
the other branches, society and the government bureaucracy itself. It should be said 
in passing that the Receita Federal and Federal Police affairs are signs that politics 
no longer controls or exercises control over the bureaucracy, which is increasingly 
tending to act autonomously.
Lula Has Monopolized Politics
Politics has now become the exclusive, monopolistic domain of Mr. Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva. He and his inner group have a program, a project that 
includes notoriously relevant issues – e.g., the great national question, social justice, 
the development of the forces of material production – but this is fl ung down 
top-to-bottom on organized and non-organized society (political parties and 
parliamentarians included).
This is clearly decisionism by the Executive, which has instruments capable 
of reducing others to impotence and into submission, even if only because this same 
Executive is identifi ed with policies that have broad social impact, such as the Bolsa 
Família program, a higher minimum wage and, now, an overhauling of retirement 
pensions.
The Executive enjoys enormous prestige among most of the people, 
especially those that have had no traditional relationship with public life and 
the political parties – a disorganized population that is the reverse face of the 
process mentioned earlier, namely, the fact that the Executive has resources to 
either promote or hinder the reproduction of the “political class”, and can also 
count on a genuine, authentic support from the masses on account of its public 
policies.
The 2010 Electoral Outlook
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — Will the political crisis have consequences on next year’s 
election?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — It is already having. Senator Marina Silva leaving 
the Workers’ Party (PT) and joining the Green Party (PV) is more than the mere 
transfer of a congresswoman. It is the departure of a fl agship character with more 
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than national signifi cance and relevance, inasmuch as it now affects the international 
sphere. It was not a fact with limited scope because it will change party structures 
in Brazil. And change them for the better. In the wake of Marina’s decision, there 
is now even talk of the possibility of Ciro Gomes becoming a candidate for a 
“minialliance” between the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Communist Party of 
Brazil (PC do B) and other associations. I don’t know whether these arrangements 
will take hold or not.
Regardless, all this commotion results in a certain political vitality, especially 
because, no matter what the outcome of the 2010 election, we can already see on 
the horizon that Lula will no longer be the major operative fi gure. This is no trivial 
development, even if his candidate, Dilma Rousseff, wins.
Dilma Rousseff does not have the personal credentials to manage the 
inventory Lula will leave behind. For the bulk of the population, she lacks charisma 
and does not have the right profi le to face the contradictions of great confl icting 
interests. Her political identity is clearer than Lula’s, however, who since his earliest 
trade union days was and has always been a masterful negotiator.
As time passes, everything seems to indicate that when the great operator 
retires to his own personal São Borja2, São Bernardo, the game will become 
more fl uid, especially because the incumbent party, the Workers’ Party, lost 
strength during the two mandates of its president. The party is now weaker, more 
disoriented, more inarticulate.
In addition, the PT has not found its way amidst the ongoing political and 
ideological homogenization and no new powerful leaderships have emerged. The 
great PT leaders, such as a Genoíno and José Dirceu, are far from enjoying their 
former glory. Palocci may return, but not as strong as before. What cadres has the 
PT developed over these eight years? Its members are mere operative cogs of a 
bureaucracy. The party’s current president, Berzoini, is one of those cogs, a man 
with no inner light, someone who is driven, not a driver.
The scenario without Lula will be more constructive than the one we 
had with him. If with Lula we had eight years of peace, on the other hand the 
opposition was reduced to impotence and Congress was dragged into the sphere of 
infl uence of the Executive, which immobilized the lowly sectors of society through 
its social welfare policies and its programs of symbolic integration.
The president has always asserted his humble origins and does so with 
tremendous authenticity. With Rousseff or Serra, who have more or less well-defi ned 
projects, confl icts will increase because we will no longer be acting in the scenario 
created by Lula, who prevented confl icts from going out of the palace chambers and 
into the streets. Lula was the great arbitrator of confl icts.
One Possible Policy Reform and Parliamentarism
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — Considering this future, do you believe these impacts 
will increase or will we move toward solutions for many problems if a political reform is 
implemented? How do you see this political reform?
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Luiz Werneck Vianna — I don’t know what it would look like, because 
there is no ideal political reform. Countries have found their party system and 
their form of political representation by trial and error. Take France, for instance: 
how many attempts were there until 1958 and De Gaulle! Yet the system has 
worked well since then. Political reform is not based on the work of a sage who, 
after consulting all the laws of the world, fi nally discovers the best political reform 
for one country. Things are not like that. Political reform emerges from the heat 
of political struggle. One system excludes certain sectors, another maintains the 
representation of majority sectors… Everything depends on the type of political 
struggle. For me, the key is understanding that mandates belong to the political 
parties, not to the parliamentarians. Any reform that does not advance in this 
direction is doomed to frustration, because it will reiterate what we already have.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS  — Would you favor pure district voting or a mixed system?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — I would welcome a combination of the majority 
and proportional systems, that is, a mixed system. Another issue that I also fi nd 
absolutely essential, related to this one, is the public funding of election campaigns 
in order to decontaminate elections from money.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — Until recently, parliamentarism was a presentable 
option. Isn’t it time to revive the movement in favor of parliamentarism?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — No. Certain things would have to be done fi rst: 
better organized public spheres, and more robust parties, for instance. The large 
mass of the population would now see parliamentarianism as a loss of power, 
because they seem themselves represented by the president. The presidency is the 
masses’ venue of representation. Furthermore, we should not forget our imperial 
tradition…
Morality and the Struggle against Corruption
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — Apparently, the political crisis that emerged and 
remained in the headlines originated from charges of corruption. It was not caused by 
any issue pertaining to the economy. Doesn’t this fact show that corruption calls have 
a decisive infl uence on political life? I remember that when Getúlio Vargas committed 
suicide in 1954, what triggered the crisis was the problem of governmental corruption. 
How do you analyze the matter of public morality in the Brazilian political process?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — I’d like to counter common sense and warn of the 
dangers of penalizing the Republic and turning the penal code into one of the prime 
tools of the Brazilian Republic. This understanding is also responsible for converting 
the political arena into a huge judicial arena. I think the media is the main player here, 
especially through its line of investigative journalism. The media, the Federal Police 
and the Federal Prosecutor’s Offi ce now work together and have become an explosive 
presence in Brazil. It is not an uncommon perception that some of the most glaring, 
notorious and dramatic cases derive from the articulation of these three institutions – 
the media, the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecutor’s Offi ce.
Their alleged purpose might be an attempt to bring morality into public 
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life and the creation of republican virtues. These endeavors are no longer a matter 
for political parties and organized society and have become issues for State 
corporations and the media, which are not subject to any mechanisms of societal 
control. I understand that the rational-legal order and the issue of public morality 
are fundamental questions that should be safeguarded and developed. But I do 
not think they should become the monopoly of a corporation or of a media that is 
accountable to no one except itself.
It should be noted that despite the notoriety of recent scandals, society was 
not mobilized. It was not moved politically, unlike what happened during Collor’s 
impeachment. These are all signs of changes in behavior and attitude. I think that 
from now on, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate will manage their internal 
affairs differently.
Modern Brazil Must Accept Backwardness
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — Public opinion did not mobilize over the Senate’s 
problems. Could this result from the fact that Collor became president without grassroots 
support and without taking steps to benefi t the masses, while Lula’s conduct was 
altogether different?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — I fully agree. But if the majority of people were truly 
sensitive to this issue, they would have already tuned in to this crisis, to the scandal 
in the Senate. But they did not, and I do not think they ever will.
I would call your attention to another issue that needs to be analyzed, 
namely, the fact that the administrations of Fernando Henrique and Lula are 
expressions of modernity, of modern concerns of São Paulo – or, at least, of the most 
innovative sector. But there are other countries in Brazil, such as the North, which is 
somewhat unruly, with a new capitalism, new entrepreneurial heroes, many of them 
from lowly sectors of society, especially soybean plantations, one of the frontiers 
of Brazilian capitalism. This frontier is energetic, has a thriving business life, has 
yet to be baptized by civilization, has yet to acquire the veneer of civilization. It is 
appetitive and passionate about its own interests and has yet to learn what it means 
to live in a Republic.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — At the same time, however, this sector has a very large 
political representation, beginning with its presence in the Senate.
Luiz Werneck Vianna — I know and that’s where the problem lies. This 
sector, not only for its weight on the country’s social and economic life, but also 
for its political representation, has to be taken into account, despite the mortgage 
of backwardness it embodies. Isn’t it so? Modernity has been forced to incorporate 
backwardness in order to stabilize the government, to stabilize its power. This was 
done by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is being done by Lula, but one must be 
careful not to overreach.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — The infl uence in the Senate of leaderships from [the 
Northern states of] Roraima, Rondônia, Amapá and even Maranhão is quite 
signifi cant, isn’t it?
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Luiz Werneck Vianna — Yes, it is. And the Executive is obliged to take it 
into account. That is, it must govern guided not only by the modern sectors of 
Brazil, but also by the patrimonialist tradition (as much as I dislike this term) of 
these victorious sectors from the hinterlands – capitalist heroes with their particular 
brand of nepotism, personal authoritarianism and the like –, involving them in the 
development of social policies and even in determining the form of the State.
The Judicialization of Politics
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — How do you analyze the intervention of the Judiciary 
in matters of the Legislative branch? Some consider this a positive development. Others 
recall the classic statement of principle of the three branches of government and fi nd this 
type of intrusion absurd. Is this type of meddling here to stay?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — It has come to stay. The clearest and most 
anecdotal example is the attitude of the Party of Socialism and Liberty (PSOL), 
which requested the Supreme Court (STF) to revoke the closure of the debate, by 
the Senate’s Ethics Committee, on the expostulations against Sarney. An act such 
as this practically demands that the Judiciary interfere in the internal affairs of 
the Legislature and alter a decision made by a parliamentary majority. A stronger 
indicator of this trend I do not know. It is worth noting that the PSOL is a 
radicalized leftist party, so to speak.
This approach leads to the judicialization of politics, a worldwide 
phenomenon, although restricted to democratic countries. Countries with 
authoritarian political regimes do not face the judicialization of politics.
Moreover, underlying every projection of the Judiciary’s infl uence on society 
and on politics is the Legislative branch, because it ensures, unveils and opens up 
the frontiers of the Judiciary’s new role. I will give some examples: the direct legal 
action of unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court, the civil class actions, are all 
instruments created by legislator through which society can mobilize the Judiciary 
to produce certain results in political life.
It is as if the Legislative understood its impotence in face of the contemporary 
scene and created institutions and mechanisms to allow society to defend itself 
from the State and from business corporations: consumer rights, urban statutes, 
laws to protect senior citizens, children, and women (such as the Maria da Penha 
Law), among others. The creation of the European Union is perhaps the best 
demonstration of this fact. The European Union remains to this day without a 
political constitution and, in large measure, was created through the mediation of 
Law and its institutions.
We also have supranational laws and courts that now interfere in the life 
of nation-States. Not to mention the creation of new world institutions, such as 
International Criminal Court, to punish genocides and war crimes beyond the 
borders of nation-States.
The presence of Law in politics and in contemporary life is an indissoluble 
reality, and we should not obscure the interesting elements that underlie it. New 
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arenas for democratic life outside political representation in the world of functional 
representation are emerging, for instance, because the Judiciary is part of the 
world of functional representation. New possibilities are also emerging with the 
increasingly independent means of access to justice and the increasingly facilitated 
mechanisms (such as civil class actions) that enable society to participate in the 
development of laws. This is an ongoing, operative phenomenon.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — Isn’t the slight modernization of Justice in Brazil 
already visible, including the creation of special courts and several other initiatives? 
At the same time, however, the actions of Congress in Brasilia resemble those of an 
ineffective mastodon.
Luiz Werneck Vianna — We have a very powerful Executive and an 
increasingly powerful Judiciary. The palaces of the Judiciary in Brasília are daunting, 
monumental and always expanding, with new annexes for this and that. The 
Legislative, representing the quintessential popular sovereignty, is dwindling. This is 
the current situation.
I would say that the Executive has acted in such a ways as to benefi t from 
inarticulacy and dysfunctions of the Legislative branch, which seems irresponsive 
and confi ned to the logic of its demands for self-reproduction. Thus, the Executive 
fi nds enough grazing ground to advance its politics and dominate the public sphere. 
This is what is happening among us. Great politics has no place in the congressional 
scene, only in the Executive. Yet, is this inevitable? No, it isn’t, but we have a 
tradition, a powerful history of pork barrel incentives that inhibits the development 
of a strong collective will.
The Experience of Rio’s Favelas 
Marco Antonio, I’ll give you an example of an issue that has always been a 
reference for me – the shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro. Over the last 50 years, they 
did not strengthen their community-mindedness and were unable project themselves 
into the public sphere, but nevertheless carried out their entire agenda (water, gas, 
soil) without imposing it on society through autonomous political actions.
Why has the government recently prioritized the slums in Rio de Janeiro as 
a central issue? Because of the violence. Not because anyone wishes the favelas to 
organize themselves. Social programs are delivered from above and do not arouse 
the spirit of citizenship.
In this fashion, no political leaderships emerge. And it cannot be said that 
the results have not been effective; on the contrary, they could not have been more 
effective. I have never witnessed any kind of civic struggle in the favela of which we 
are neighbors here at Iuperj. But an elevator was installed there, the houses were 
painted and so on. Iuperj is a center of social sciences. The slum is there, right beside 
us, but there is no communication between us. How does life go on? How does this 
world live? Is there any political action? Yes, of what kind? The pork barrel kind.
Violence led the shantytowns to cease being a local phenomenon and take on 
a central role in the life of Brazilian cities, especially in Rio de Janeiro, mobilizing 
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the federal government and major business groups. The Atlântica Group is doing a 
type of social work in the Pavão-Pavãozinho favela that seems to me a very effective 
approach to the problem of urban land usage and the collective easement by 
prescription of real estate.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS  — I worked in Rio de Janeiro 30 years ago and at that 
time the labor unions had a very strong movement. What is happening now?
Luiz Werneck Vianna — Unionism is strong, but is completely dominated 
by the apex, the leadership, because unions are just another player brought into 
the machine of the State. Paulo Pereira da Silva [a labor leader and federal deputy] 
hovers in the Brazilian public sphere as a major player. And indeed he is. But 
society is completely demobilized in terms of its access to public life. It is retracted, 
which does not mean that its interests are not considered. Paulo Pereira da Silva is 
working on behalf of everyone to assure that retirement pensions are this or that, 
that workdays are this or that, even though the unions have been emptied. The 
entire process is also derived from this asymmetry between the apex of the State and 
society, because everything is controlled from above. Such is the disruptive nature of 
the Brazilian tradition.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS — This is also not a strictly national phenomenon and, 
according to the media, the same occurs in Italy, France, England, countries that had a 
long tradition of unionized association and struggle.
Luiz Werneck Vianna — French unions have not lost their claws. Once 
in a while, at least once a year, they show up – although, it is true, without their 
former vigor. [In Brazil], this period has been a period of losses; let us think about 
it this way. Especially in the political realm, where society has been infantilized 
by the paternalistic and tutelary style of the Lula administration. But there have 
been evident gains in the economy, in social issues, in the role of Brazil in the 
international scene. For me, with the end of Lula’s mandate, a new opportunity 
arises for society to rethink its political and social organizations. Among the good 
things that the Lula administration will bequeath us, one – of no small importance 
– was his relinquishing the claim to a third term, ensuring the democratic principle 
of the alternation of power.
Notes
1 Monthly allowances allegedly paid to congresspersons allied with the Lula administration in 
exchange for political support in Congress. The scheme was denounced on June 6, 2005.
2 São Borja: reference to the city that sheltered former dictator Getúlio Vargas in his self-
imposed exile. While there, he was sought by politicians to return to political life and was 
eventually elected president in 1950.
Translated by Carlos Malferrari. The original in Portuguese is available at http://www.
scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_issuetoc&pid=0103-401420090002&lng=pt&nrm=iso. 
